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THE BOUNDARIES OF A CHURCH'S FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS AN EMPLOYER
The freedom of religion which allows a church to consider homosexuality to be
sinful may clash with the rights of a church's secular employee if the employee is
discharged because of his or her sexualpreference in violation of antidiscrimination
laws. This Note, beginning with a general analysis of a church's legal status in the
role of employer, focuses on the constitutional issues raised by such a discharge
under the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and general constitu-
tional theory. The Note concludes with a series offactual guidelines which indicate
when a church'r religious freedom outweighs a secular employee's statutory civil
rights.
INTRODUCTION
THE FIRST amendment's broad statement that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of a religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof" was, in large part, a re-
sponse to the religious persecution experienced by many of
America's first settlers in their native European countries which
had state-supported religions.2 Thomas Jefferson, whose 1779 Bill
for Establishing Religious Freedom was the forerunner of the first
amendment, emphatically argued that the mandate of the first
amendment should be granted the broadest possible scope in
favor of churches.3 Likewise, James Madison stated: "There is
not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle
with religion. Its interference with [religion] would be a most
flagrant usurpation."4 Simultaneously, however, Madison indi-
cated his distrust of a powerful church. For example, during the
first session of Congress in June 1789 he proposed that Congress
adopt the following constitutional amendment: "The civil rights
of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or wor-
ship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the
full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any
1. U.S. Cot'sr. amend. I. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of
the first amendment have been applied to state action since their incorporation into the
fourteenth amendment in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947), and
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), respectively.
2. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-35 (1962); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 8-13 (1947).
3. See 2 J. BOYD, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 547 (1950).
4. 5 J. MADISON, WRrriNGS 176 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).
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pretext, infringed."5
These conflicting concerns of the Founders were ultimately
embodied in the first amendment and have continued to be ex-
pressed by Supreme Court decisions which reflect a "conviction
that government must never take sides on religious matters.
' 6
Specifically, the Supreme Court interprets the first amendment's
Free Exercise Clause to be the means of assuring that government
does not intrude excessively upon the religious liberty of churches
or private individuals7 and interprets the Establishment Clause to
be the means of preventing a union of church and state which
could tend "to destroy government and to degrade religion."8 In
essence, the first amendment grants a certain protective right to a
church. The responsibility to define the boundaries of this right in
particular situations, however, has devolved upon the courts. A
church in its role as employer presents one such situation with
which the courts have been, and continue to be, confronted.
5. W. TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 24 (1970).
6. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 871 (1978).
7. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963) (Free Exercise right of a
member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, who refused to work on the Saturday Sab-
bath, abridged by application of a state unemployment compensation act providing that a
claimant is ineligible for benefits if the individual fails, without good cause, to accept suita-
ble work offered).
8. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962) (nondenominational prayer which a local
school board directed to be recited in class held violative of the Establishment Clause). See
also Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REv. 25 (1962).
Federal and state legislation must be neutral toward religion. See, e.g., Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221 (1963) (public school board prohibited from
requiring that passages from the Bible be read or that the Lord's Prayer be recited at the
beginning of each school day); Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 798-99, 587 P.2d
663, 667-68, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867, 871-72 (1978) (the holiday illumination of a large cross on
the Los Angeles City Hall held violative of the Establishment Clause because it promoted
spiritual content).
Legislation neutral on its face may breach the Establishment Clause when applied to a
religious institution. NLRB v. Catholic Archbishop, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (church-
operated schools which teach both religious and secular subjects are beyond the National
Labor Relations Board's statutory jurisdiction because of significant risk of infringement of
the first amendment religion clauses).
Regarding the apparent tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses,
one commentator has suggested that the Free Exercise Clause has evolved into "the fa-
vored child of the First Amendment" because its mandate has so often been held to be
preeminent in a conflict between the two clauses. See Pfeffer, The Supremacy ofFree Exer-
cise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115, 1142 (1973). E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972)
("[the Supreme Court] must not ignore the danger that an exception from a general obliga-
tion of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establishment Clause, but the
danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how vital it may be to the
protection of values promoted by the right of free exercise"). For a more detailed discus-




It is clear that the first amendment places the relationship of a
church to its minister beyond the reach of governmental employ-
ment regulation.9 On the other hand, it has been held that a
church must heed such laws when it discharges an employee with
secular duties for reasons which are not central to the church's
doctrine.10 The courts, however, have not yet been confronted
with the intermediate issue of whether the first amendment pre-
cludes the application of employment laws when such a secular
employee is discharged for violation of an essential church tenet."'
This issue was recently litigated in Walker v. First Orthodox
Presbyterian Church2 Walker involved the employment of the
plaintiff, Walker, as a part-time organist by the First Orthodox
Presbyterian Church of San Francisco. Before he was hired,
Walker was required, as are all prospective Church employees, to
give a credible Christian testimony to the pastor.13 Five months
after Walker was hired, the pastor received reports that Walker
was a practicing homosexual. 4 The Church's doctrine, based on
the Bible, 5 maintains that homosexuality is a sin and a practice
not to be engaged in by true Christians. 6 Although Walker ad-
mitted that he was a homosexual, he refused to stop his homosex-
9. See notes 24-35 infra and accompanying text.
10. Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (defense of exercise of first amendment rights held not available to church
whose discharge of a white female employee because of her social relationship with a black
male was not based on church doctrine).
11. Although an "essential church tenet" has not been judicially defined, at the least,
it appears to include a church belief which is held honestly and in good faith and which is
central to the practice of the religion. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)
(belief held honestly and in good faith); United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
(belief must be central to the practice of the religion).
12. [19801 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 762.
13. Walker v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church, No. 760-028, slip. op. at 2, 3 (San
Francisco County Super. Ct. April 3, 1980).
14. Id at 3.
15. Eg., Leviticus 18:22 (Rev. Std.) ("You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it
is an abomination"), 20:13; Deuteronomy 23:17; 1 Kings 14:24, 22:46; 2 Kings 23:7; 1 Corin-
thians 6:9 (Rev. Std.). A passage from Romans states:
Therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the
dishonoring of their bodies among themselves, because they exchanged the truth
about God for a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Crea-
tor, who is blessed forever! Amen. For this reason God gave them up to dishon-
orable passions. Their women exchanged natural relations for unnatural, and the
men likewise gave up natural relations with women and were consumed with
passion for one another, men committing shameless acts with men and receiving
in their own persons the due penalty for their error.
Romans 1:24-27 (Rev. Std.).
16. Walker v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church, No. 760-028, slip. op. at 3, 4 (San
Francisco County Super. Ct. April 3, 1980).
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ual practices, claiming that they did not conflict with his Christian
faith."7 Nevertheless, the pastor fired Walker, who then sued the
Church, alleging violation of a local ordinance"8 which prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Thus, Walker set up a stark confrontation between a church's
power as an employer under the first amendment and a dis-
charged employee's right to protection and enforcement of statu-
tory civil rights. 19
This Note addresses and attempts to resolve the issue posed by
Walker of whether the first amendment allows a church the free-
dom to discharge a secular employee who has violated an essential
tenet of church doctrine when that employee claims the protection
of antidiscrimination legislation. The Note will first examine the
church-minister employment relationship in order to extract the
judicial principles which recognize a church's absolute discretion
in the hiring and firing of ministers.20 Second, the Note will ex-
amine cases involving a church's relationship with nonmembers
who are employed for secular purposes and will set forth the rea-
sons for disallowing such absolute church control in this relation-
ship.21 Third, the Note will examine the legal theories utilized by
the litigants in Walker and analyze the arguments that were made,
and which could have been made, in support of these positions.22
Finally, the Note will attempt to resolve the issue posed in Walker
by identifying the circumstances in which a church should be able
to discharge a secular employee who has violated an essential
church tenet and, thereby, offer guidelines for determining the
boundaries of a church's first amendment power as an employer.23
17. Id. at 4.
18. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE art. 33, §§ 3301-10 (1978). Section 3303 pro-
vides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person to do any of the following acts
wholly or partially based on sexual orientation of an employee or applicant for employ-
ment: (I) By an employer: To fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual ....
A private enforcement action is expressly authorized. Id § 3307.
19. The San Francisco County Superior Court resolved the issue by granting the
Church's motion for summary judgment. In doing so, the court held "the application of
San Francisco Police Code Section 3301 et seq., to the facts of this case unconstitutionally
infringes upon the rights of the. . .Church and its members to freely exercise their reli-
gious beliefs." Walker v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church, No. 760-028, slip. op. at 2
(San Francisco County Super. Ct. April 3, 1980).
20. See notes 24-35 infra and accompanying text.
21. See notes 36-44 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 45-121 ifra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 122-31 infra and accompanying text.
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I. THE CHURCH-MINISTER RELATIONSHIP
The church-minister relationship stands as the most evident
example of the deference granted by the first amendment to a
church's employment policies. The prohibition against govern-
mental interference with the relationship rests on an interpretation
of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses which gives singu-
lar importance to a church's right to manage its own internal af-
fairs.
The Supreme Court's recognition of this principle extends
back to 1871 when, in Watson v. Jones, the Court first held that
matters of church administration are beyond state control.24 In
Watson, the highest ecclesiastical body of the Presbyterian
Church had recognized one of two factions competing for control
of church property as the "regular and lawful" governing body of
the church.25 The Supreme Court affirmed a federal district court
decision 26 that the factions were bound by the ecclesiastical ruling,
stating:
Whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith or ecclesiasti-
cal rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of
these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried,
the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as
binding on them, in their application to the case before
them .... All who unite themselves to [a church] do so with
an implied consent to [its] government, and are bound to sub-
mit to it.
27
Thus, although Watson was not specifically concerned with the
church in the role of an employer, it represents the first step in the
Supreme Court's delineation of a church's first amendment right
to control internal affairs in accordance with its duly established
beliefs.
Fifty-eight years later the Court applied the Watson rule to the
church-minister employment relationship in Gonzales v. Roman
Catholic 4rchbishop.28 In holding that a church has complete
control over the hiring of its ministers, even though the selection
24. 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
25. Id at 694.
26. Id at 698.
27. 80 U.S. at 727-29. See also Mack v. Kime, 129 Ga. 1, 58 S.E. 184 (1907) (church's
power to decide a property right issue which was dependent on church doctrine and com-
pulsory application of that decision in civil court affirmed).
28. 280 U.S. 1 (1929) (upholding church's ecclesiastical control over the appointment
of a chaplain other than a descendant of the foundress of the chaplaincy who failed to meet
the prescribed qualifications).
1981]
CAISE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
might conceivably affect the potential ministers' civil rights, the
Court stated: "In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness,
the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ec-
clesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation
before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in in-
terest made them so by contract or otherwise."29
In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,30 the Court went beyond
such implied contract theory to establish expressly a church's first
amendment right to appoint or discharge clergy according to the
dictates of its doctrine. In essence, the Court held the rights of the
corporate religious body paramount over the discharged minister's
alleged civil rights, reasoning that this result best complies with
the first amendment's goal of church protection from state or judi-
cial interference.3'
The prohibition against government interference in the
church-minister employment relationship is extensive. For exam-
ple, in 1972, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in McClure v.
Salvation Army 32 that application of the employment discrimina-
tion prohibitions in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196 133 to
the relationship between the Salvation Army and its officers
would violate the first amendment. The McClure court stated that
such application would involve an investigation and review of
Salvation Army practices with regard to a minister's assignment,
his salary and his duties, which
would, as a result, cause the State to intrude upon matters of
church administration and government which have so many
times before been proclaimed to be matters of a singular eccle-
29. Id at 16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
30. 344 U.S. 94 (1956) (State Religious Corporations Law, which had the purpose and
effect of transferring administrative control of the Russian Orthodox Churches in North
America from the Supreme Church Authority in Moscow to the authorities selected by
convention of the North American churches, held violative of the Free Exercise Clause).
31. Id at 107-08. The Court stated that "legislation that regulates church administra-
tion, the operation of the churches [or] the appointment of clergy. . . prohibits the free
exercise of religion." Id Relying on the "spirit" of religious freedom in Watson, the Court
also stated: "Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are
proven, we think, must now be said to have constitutional protection as a part of the free
exercise of religion against state interference." Id at 116.
32. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
33. The statute provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin....
Civil Rights Act of 1961, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
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siastical concern. Control of strictly ecclesiastical matters could
easily pass from the church to the State. The church would
then be without the power to decide for itself, free from state
interference, matters of church administration and govern-
ment.
34
In effect, even an incidental burden on the free exercise of religion
must be supported by a compelling state interest.
Thus, in accordance with the principle that the first amend-
ment protects a church's right to control matters of internal doc-
trine and administration, a church can hire or fire its minister
without regard to governmental employment regulation. Essen-
tially, the Free Exercise Clause mandates that the rights of the
corporate religious body outweigh the discharged minister's civil
rights. Exceptions to the rule are rare; only when the church ac-
tion involves fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, or when there is a
compelling state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the
church's first amendment protection, can the state intervene in the
ministerial relationship.35
II. THE CHURCH-SECULAR EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
The McClure court expressly limited its grant of absolute em-
ployment discretion to the church-minister relationship.36 Such
broad powers do not, without more, appear to extend to a church's
relationship with employees who perform secular, not strictly reli-
gious, duties.37 Indeed, the courts have uniformly accepted the
application of governmental employment regulations to such em-
ployees when they engage in nonreligious or commercial activity.
In 1954, the Seventh Circuit held that application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to employees involved with the religious cor-
poration's activities in interstate commerce did not violate the
church's first amendment freedoms.38 Similarly, in King's Garden
Inc. v. FCC,39 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the application of FCC antibias regulations to a religious
organization's radio station because the jobs at issue fell outside
the regulations' narrow religious exemption; they either had no
connection with program content or were connected with pro-
34. 460 F.2d at 560.
35. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
36. 460 F.2d at 555.
37. Such employees are hereinfter referred to as "secular employees."
38. Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879, 885 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954).
39. 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
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grams having no religious dimension.4"
Thus, it can be said that where a religious organization's main
goal is financial, not spiritual, governmental employment regula-
tions should be held applicable to secular employees. However, if
a church can demonstrate that its goals are religious, not financial,
the first amendment protection of its decision to discharge a secu-
lar employee who has violated an essential church tenet might be
viewed differently.
Courts have also held that employment statutes which may
impose an indirect burden on religious practice without making
the practice itself unlawful may constitutionally be applied to a
church's secular employees.4' At least one court, however, has
held that even an incidental burden on the practice of religion is
unconstitutional in the absence of an urgent state interest.42
Finally, there is support for the proposition that a church can-
not discharge a secular employee for a reason other than an "es-
sential tenet" 43 of the church's doctrine. If there is evidence that
the church does not hold the relevant doctrine in good faith and
that the tenet is not a necessary element of the practice of the reli-
gion, then the tenet is not "essential," and it should follow that the
church is absolutely precluded from discriminating in employ-
ment on that basis.'
It is unclear, however, whether the first amendment protects a
church which discharges a secular employee for violating an es-
sential church tenet, even though discharge on similar grounds
outside of the religious sphere would violate the employee's fed-
eral or state statutory rights. Faced with this situation, the courts
must weigh the importance of two competing factors: 1) the abso-
40. 498 F.2d at 53-54. For a discussion of this problem as it relates to Title VII's
shifting religious exemption, see generally Note, The Constitutionality of the 1972 Amend-
ment to Title VI"s Exemption/or Religious Organizations, 73 MICH. L. REV. 538 (1975).
See also note 117 infra and accompanying text.
41. Eg., Marshall v. Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, [19771
EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) (14 Empl. Prac. Dec.) 5956 (C.D. Cal.) (application of the
Equal Pay Act of 1963 to secular employees of a parochial school held not to be an uncon-
stitutional infringement on the institution's religious doctrine). See also Braunfield v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing law upheld against claims by plaintiffs, mem-
bers of the Orthodox Jewish faith, of interference with their religious freedom).
42. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1972) (state legislation
which, at the most, imposes an incidental burden on the free exercise of religion will be
upheld only when a compelling state interest involving the "gravest abuses" or endanger-
ing "paramount interests" exists).
43. See Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363




lute control of the church over violations of church doctrine, and
2) the extent to which government regulation can become in-
volved with the church-secular employee relationship. The Note
proceeds with an examination of the theories and first amendment
arguments presented in Walker v. First Presbyterian Church,4 5 in
its attempt to reconcile these competing factors and to clarify and
define the limits of a church's first amendment rights as employer.
III. THE WA4LKER CASE
Walker presents a factual situation in which a part-time organ-
ist, Walker, was discharged by the First Orthodox Presbyterian
Church of San Francisco because, the Church claimed, his admit-
ted homosexual activity violated an essential tenet of the Church's
doctrine.46 Walker sued upon the violation of the San Francisco
Police Code which forbids employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation,4 7 and expressly authorizes private enforce-
ment.48
The parties presented three constitutional theories applicable
to the issue of whether a church may discharge a secular employee
who violates an essential church tenet. These three theories, and
their respective arguments, stem from the Free Exercise Clause,
the Establishment Clause, and application of the "least restrictive
means to attain a compelling state interest" test.
A. Free Exercise Arguments
Supreme Court precedent has interpreted the Free Exercise
Clause as the means by which churches and private individuals
can be assured that government will not intrude excessively upon
their religious liberty.49 It is unclear, however, whether the free
exercise of religion is truly inhibited by requiring churches to
comply with governmental employment regulations in their deal-
ings with secular employees. In an attempt to resolve this uncer-
tainty, this Note will compare the positions of the Church and
Walker to determine precisely what conduct constitutes the free
exercise of religion and when governmental interests may intrude
upon that conduct.
45. [1980] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 762. See text accompa-
nying note 12 supra.
46. See notes 12-18 supra and accompanying text.
47. SAN FRANCIsco, CAL., MUN. CODE art. 33, §§ 3301-10 (1978).
48. Id § 3307.
49. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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The Church's Free Exercise arguments may be summarized in
two statements. First, the application of the San Francisco Police
Code violates the Free Exercise Clause by legally supporting a
violation of the Church's essential tenet that homosexuality is a
sin and that unrepentant sinners cannot be part of the worship
team." Second, the government's failure to accommodate these
fundamental beliefs in its enactment and application of the San
Francisco Police Code violates the Free Exercise Clause because
the government could achieve its legitimate legislative goals with-
out impinging on religious freedoms."
Walker also had two arguments. First, although the Church
has the absolute constitutional freedom to hold the religious belief
that homosexuality is sinful, it does not have absolute first amend-
ment protection to act upon such a belief. 2 Second, the applica-
tion of the Police Code would not violate the Free Exercise Clause
because, at most, it would have an incidental and indirect effect
upon the Church's free exercise of religion.13
The Church's first argument in its defense was that its decision
to discharge Walker was based on its essential tenet that un-
repentant homosexuality is a sin according to the Bible.54 There-
fore, it was a decision on a purely ecclesiastical matter which must
be accepted by a civil court." Walker claimed, however, that
there is a distinction between religious beliefs, which are abso-
50. Defendant's and Cross-Complainant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Order Specifying Issues Without Substantial Controversy and for
Summary Judgment at 10-11, 23, Walker v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church, [1980]
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 762 [hereinafter cited as Brief for De-
fendant]. The Church claimed that Walker, in his deposition, admitted he was part of the
"worship team." Id at 10.
Plaintiff disputed that he was part of the "worship team," claiming that as a part-time
organist he added only musical accompaniment to an existing procedure, that he had no
input into the procedure, and that he was first introduced to the "worship team" concept at
the time of his deposition. Plaintiff's and Cross-Defendant's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Motion for Order Specifying Issues Without Substantial Con-
troversy and in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Walker v. First Ortho-
dox Presbyterian Church, [1980] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 762
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiff].
51. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 28.
52. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 50, at 20-21.
53. Id at 21.
54. See note 15 supra.
55. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 23 (citing Metropolitan Baptist Church of
Richmond, Inc. v. Younger, 48 Cal. App. 3d 850, 858, 121 Cal. Rptr. 899, 903 (1975)):
"[E]cclesiastical matters ordinarily concern creeds and the proper mode of exercising one's
belief, considerations of faith, including questions of what constitutes an essential of a
church's faith, and matters of church discipline, tenets and general polity").
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lutely protected by the first amendment, and actions based on
those beliefs, which are not absolutely protected. 6 This claim is
not without merit, for courts have held that a state's child labor
law may be applied to a child who sells religious literature as part
of his or her religious observance,5" and that a church's refusal to
comply with the Equal Pay Act58 or the federal minimum wage
law,59 or its refusal to pay legitimately assessed federal income
taxes60 cannot be justified on religious grounds.
In these instances, however, enforcement of the particular stat-
ute did not violate a tenet which was essential to the practice of
the religion.6' In Walker, on the other hand, the known fact that
the organist leading the hymns is an avowed homosexual arguably
could disrupt the practice of the Church's religion, since members
of the congregation may believe that to be led in song by an indi-
vidual who violates the commands of the God they worship is to
be hypocritical or sacreligious.
Furthermore, Walker might not have been correct in arguing
that the first amendment never protects actions upon religious be-
liefs. One court has implied that balancing is involved:
"[R]egulation of [religious] conduct will be countenanced if it im-
pinges on free exercise freedoms only when the government dem-
onstrates a compelling state interest which outweighs the
inhibition of the religiously based conduct. ' 62 Thus, apparently
the court must make a case-by-case factual determination of
whether a compelling state interest exists and whether this state
interest outweighs the adverse effect on the church likely to result
from the prohibition of the disputed church conduct.63
The Church's second Free Exercise argument was that the
government must accommodate the church's fundamental beliefs
if the government's legitimate goals can also be achieved.r 4 The
California Supreme Court applied this accommodation doctrine
56. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 50, at 20 (citing EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n,
482 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1979)).
57. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
58. Marshall v. Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, [1977] EMPL.
PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) (14 Empl. Prac. Dec.) 7806 (C.D. Cal.).
59. Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879, 884 (7th Cir.), cer. de-
nied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954).
60. Parker v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 792, 795 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1026 (1967).
61. See note 11 supra.
62. EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291, 1308 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
63. For an analysis of these issues, see notes 106-21 infra and accompanying text.
64. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 28.
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in People . Woody,65 where it held that the government could not
constitutionally apply a California criminal statute proscribing the
use of peyote to prevent a tribe of Navajo Indians from using the
drug as a sacramental symbol essential to their religious prac-
tice.6 6 Hence, if the Navajo violation of the criminal law must be
accommodated, the Church in Walker should be able to argue
that its actions, also based on an essential religious tenet, must be
accommodated as well.67 Furthermore, this accommodation ap-
pears to be possible with minimal effect on the general application
of the Police Code since Walker conceded that: "(1) Church posi-
tions are not a significant part of the total labor pool [sic], (2) there
are many other positions outside the Church where homosexuals
can earn a livelihood, and (3) many homosexuals would not want
a church position. 6
8
Walker argued that the accommodation doctrine should not be
applied because the Police Code, at most, has only an incidental
and indirect effect upon the church's free exercise of religion.69
However, Walker's authority for this proposition-Braunfield v.
Brown 7° -is quite questionable. In Braunfield, the practice of
plaintifFs religion was burdened only by financial loss. In con-
trast, application of the Police Code in Walker would have re-
quired the Church to make an untenable choice between obeying
a local ordinance in violation of its sincerely held religious beliefs
or forsaking its religious beliefs to comply with secular law.7'
Walker also implied that the Church's act of terminating a ho-
mosexual employee was not founded upon an essential church
tenet because, he argued, such terminations are not a traditional
practice of the church. Since the Church's conduct is without doc-
trinal basis, Walker noted, prohibition of that conduct would have
only an indirect effect on its free exercise of religion.72 This argu-
ment fails, however, for the test of an essential church tenet which
supports free exercise protection is not whether the tenet itself is a
traditional religious practice. Rather, the test is whether the belief
65. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1964).
66. Id at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77. Peyote is an hallucinogenic drug.
The court analogized its use by the Navajo Indians to the use of bread and wine by Chris-
tians. Id at 721, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
67. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 30.
68. Id at 29.
69. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 50, at 21.
70. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
71. See notes 12-19 supra and accompanying text.
72. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 50, at 22.
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is held by the church in good faith and is central to the practice of
the religion.73 Thus, since the tenet at issue-the sinfulness of ho-
mosexuality, coupled with the prohibition against unrepentant
sinners leading worship hymns-is indeed held in good faith and
is central to the type of worship conducted by the church,74 it
could properly support conduct to effectuate it. If the Police Code
would have barred such an effectuation by prohibiting the dis-
charge of a homosexual employee with religious duties, 75 the re-
sult clearly would have been neither incidental nor indirect.
This analysis of the Free Exercise arguments presents some
guidelines for determining the boundaries of a church's first
amendment right to discharge an employee who has violated an
essential church tenet. First, if the employee is not engaged in
commercial, profit-making activities for the church, and if the em-
ployee actually has violated an essential religious tenet of the
church, then the employee's discharge should be accepted by the
secular courts as a protected, ecclesiastical decision. Demonstra-
tion of a compelling state interest is the only apparent means of
avoiding this result. Second, the government must accommodate
a religion's essential tenets if they are both sincerely held and es-
sential to the practice of the religion and if circumstances suggest
that the government's legitimate goals can be attained notwith-
standing religious exemptions. Moreover, a statute cannot be ap-
plied to a church if to do so would force the church to choose
between violating the statute because of sincerely held religious
beliefs and complying with the statute while forsaking those be-
liefs.76 Third, the accommodation doctrine requires the courts to
inquire into the effects of enforcing the legislation on the church
rather than into the nature of the traditional church practice
which triggered the application of the statute.77
B. Establishment Clause Arguments
The Establishment Clause mandates that all federal and state
73. See note II supra and accompanying text.
74. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 23.
75. Whether the employee's duties are religious is a key factual question which the
trier of fact must decide. Walker claimed that his position as part-time organist was secular
in nature. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 50, at 2-3. The Church contended that Walker
was part of the worship team. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 10-I1.
76. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404, 406 (1963) (state unemployment act
abridged Free Exercise by denying benefits to Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to per-
form "suitable work" on Saturday, plaintiff's Sabbath).
77. See notes 64-75 supra and accompanying text.
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legislation must be neutral on its face and in its application to-
ward religion.7" The present Establishment Clause test, set forth
by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman,79 states: "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its princi-
pal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhib-
its religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' "8 It is evident that the
application of this test hinges on the meaning ascribed to the
terms "advance" and "excessive entanglement." By contrasting
the arguments set forth by the church and Walker on these ques-
tions, this Note will derive more concrete guidelines for the appli-
cation of the Establishment Clause to a church's role as employer.
The Church's arguments in support of its contention that the
Establishment Clause prohibited application of the Police Code to
the Church's decision to discharge Walker may be summarized
thus: first, the Police Code promotes any religion which condones
homosexuality over other religions which consider homosexuality
to be a sin;8' and second, the application of the Police Code would
result in "excessive entanglement" of church and government.8 2
In support of his contention that the application of the Police
Code would not violate the Establishment Clause, Walker made
four arguments. First, the purposes and primary effects of the
Code are secular and neither advance nor inhibit religion.83 Sec-
ond, failure to exempt the Church from the Code's provisions
does not constitute government promotion of religions which do
not consider homosexuality to be a sin.84 Third, exemption of the
Church from a statute which provides equal protection to heter-
osexuals and homosexuals constitutes governmental promotion of
religions which consider homosexuality to be a sin.85 Fourth, ap-
plication of the Police Code would not result in "excessive entan-
glement" of the Church and government. 86
The Church's principal argument was that the application of
the Police Code to its employment decisions would necessarily
foist political and ideological concepts of sexual orientation into
78. See note 8 supra.
79. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
80. Id at 612-13.
81. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 32-35.
82. Id at 36.
83. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 50, at 29.
84. Id at 34-35.
85. Id
86. Id at 36-38.
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ecclesiastical matters. Accordingly, the argument ran, such impo-
sition favors those religions which do not consider homosexuality
to be a sin over those which consider it an abomination. 7 This
favoritism, argued the Church, emasculates the basic protections
that the Supreme Court has stated the Establishment Clause pro-
vides:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Govern-
ment can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion ... or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person ... to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs ....
Conversely, Walker argued that exempting the Church from
the application of a statute which equally protects homosexuals
and heterosexuals from discharge on discriminatory grounds
would constitute a preference for religions which believe that ho-
mosexuality is a sin." Relying on California Supreme Court pre-
cedent,90 Walker contended that if churches engaging in
"worldly" activities, such as employment, are exempt from gov-
ernment regulation, "the direct consequence of [the churches'] ac-
tivities would be a diminution of the state's power to protect the
public health and safety and the general welfare."91 Hence,
Walker argued, to allow the Church an exemption from the Police
Code would, like the exemption from charitable solicitation regu-
lations in the cited case, be to favor unconstitutionally a religious
organization over nonreligious organizations.
Such argument, however, can be refuted successfully. Charita-
ble solicitation is an economic issue, involving the regulation of
competition among businesses-a regulation from which a church
has never been exempt. 92 In Walker, on the other hand, any
"competition" between the church which accepts homosexuality
and the church which does not is spiritual, not economic; in a
sense, the churches compete only for the right to save souls. This
distinction provides another guideline for delineating a church's
first amendment right to discharge a secular employee who has
87. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 33A.
88. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
89. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 50, at 35.
90. Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 232, 163 P.2d 704 (1945), appeal
dismissed, 331 U.S. 543 (1947).
91. Id at 245, 163 P.2d at 712.
92. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
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violated an essential church tenet. While the Establishment
Clause of the first amendment does not appear to protect such
church action if it is connected with unfair business competition
against its nonreligious rivals, it should protect a church from un-
fair religious competition from churches aided indirectly by gov-
ernment legislation.
The Church also argued that the Establishment Clause would
be violated by the "excessive entanglement" which would result
from the application of the Police Code.93 Such concern is
grounded in fundamental doctrine, for the Supreme Court has
recognized that government entanglement with religion can easily
produce dangerous political divisions along religious lines by
transforming religious differences into political issues.94 Such di-
vision is precisely the danger the Establishment Clause was
designed to prevent.95
One facet of this far-reaching threat is government entangle-
ment in church operations through state investigations. 96 The ap-
plication of the Police Code might violate the Establishment
Clause because the Code provides for a Human Rights Commis-
sion investigation and mediation of charges against a church.9 7
Moreover, the Police Code's private enforcement provision is a
source of concern; in discovery, Walker sought or obtained the
most intimate information concerning the functioning of the
Church, including the names and addresses of major Church offi-
cials and many Church documents relating to doctrine and inter-
nal operation.98
The Police Code, however, does not create an administrative
body with regulatory functions like those created by the Civil
Rights Act of 1961 or the National Labor Relations Act. 99 Like-
wise, the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission is not self-
invoked, and although the San Francisco Administrative Code
grants subpoena power to the Commission, its power to settle dis-
putes is limited to mediation with the assent of the parties."°
Yet, the Supreme Court does not appear to require an ongoing
93. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 36.
94. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
95. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
96. Id at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring).
97. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 36 (citing SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN.
CODE art. 33, § 3307 (1978)).
98. Id




supervisory and regulatory relationship with the church for gov-
ernment entanglement to exist. For example, in NLRB v. Catholic
Archbishop, 01 the Court focused on the risk of entanglement
which flows from even minimal regulation of teachers' bargaining
rights, for teachers play a key, authoritative role in fulfilling the
religious mission of a church-affiliated school.'02 Thus, the
Supreme Court appears concerned not only with proven entangle-
ment but with "potential" entanglement as well.' 03 The Court
stated in Catholic Archbishop: "It is not only the conclusions that
may be reached by the [investigative] Board which may impinge
on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but the very process
of inquiry leading to findings and conclusions."'10
The "potential" entanglement of "government in [the] difficult
classification. . . of what is or is not religious"'10 5 should have
arisen in Walker when the Court decided whether to grant the
Church its recognized first amendment freedoms. Such a decision
would have necessarily required inquiry into whether Walker's
employment and discharge were religious or secular in nature.
This investigation would have been "the very process of inquiry"
which the Catholic Archbishop Court found to present a possibility
of excessive entanglement.
The foregoing analysis of the Establishment Clause adds two
more guidelines for courts to utilize in determining a church's first
amendment right to discharge a secular employee for violating an
essential church tenet. First, the legislation affording the dis-
charged secular employee his or her civil rights cannot prefer that
employee's religious beliefs over the church's religious doctrine if
the church engages in competition only for individuals' spiritual
loyalty and abstains from using its first amendment protections to
101. 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (parochial schools in which both religious and secular subjects
are taught held not to be within the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction because,
among other reasons, a significant risk of infringement of the first amendment religion
clause would result).
102. Id at 501-02. The Court noted that this "key role played by teachers in such a
school system has been the predicate for our conclusions that governmental aid channeled
through teachers creates an impermissible risk of excessive governmental entanglement in
the affairs of church-operated schools." Id at 501. The Church could not reasonably ar-
gue that a similar risk was present with a part-time organist whose medium of communica-
tion was music and who admittedly played no part in Church administrative decisions.
103. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 37.
104. 440 U.S. at 502.
105. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 38 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 698 (1970)). Walker argued that this aspect of Walz was inapposite because that case
involved an intrachurch dispute over ecclesiastical matters. Brief for Plaintiff, xupra note
50, at 36-37.
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engage in unfair business competition with nonreligious entities.
Second, the Establishment Clause may prevent the application of
a statute to a church's employment decisions if to do so would
require in-depth investigation by a governmental body. Indeed,
even an inquiry into whether the employment was religious in na-
ture may be considered "excessive entanglement" of church and
state.
C. 'Least Restrictive Means to Attain a Compelling State
Interest" Arguments
Any government action which infringes upon a sincerely held,
essential religious belief must be the least restrictive means avail-
able to the government for attaining its compelling interest. This
judicial limitation protects first amendment religious freedoms
from being impaired, directly or indirectly, by government meas-
ures unless there are no alternative means of attaining the compel-
ling state interest.'0 6 The Supreme Court has defined compelling
state interests as "only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served. ... 107 Thus, a showing of mere ra-
tional relation to a possible state interest is insufficient to outweigh
the first amendment's protection of religious freedom. 08
In Walker, the state's interest in ferreting out employment dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation was pitted against the
Church's need for the freedom to obey its doctrine and discharge
106. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 846-59.
107. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
The Supreme Court has also laid down the alternative Free Exercise principle that
religious freedom may not be violated unless an individual's or group's religious conduct
constitutes a "clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State ... [or a]
menace to public peace and order. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311
(1940).
The "clear and present danger" test was applied recently to a case involving a fact
situation similar to Walker. In Department of Human Rights ex rel Murphy v. Buchanan,
No. 429871 (D.C. Ramsey County, Minn., Sept. 24, 1979), the court held that there was no
clear and present danger to a substantial state interest in not hiring a homosexual to teach
in a church-operated school. But see Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 384 (1974) ("sub-
stantial" interest of Federal Government in procuring and supporting military manpower,
pursuant to United States Constitution article I, § 8, held sufficient to sustain challenged
veterans' legislation which denied educational benefits to conscientious objectors who per-
formed alternate civilian service); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) ("sub-
stantial" interest of Federal Government in procuring military manpower, pursuant to
United States Constitution, article I, § 8, held to justify the incidental burdens on religious
beliefs of those who claimed exemption from military service as conscientious objectors to
participation in Vietnam war).




an employee who had violated an essential church tenet. The
Church contended not only that Walker had failed to demonstrate
that San Francisco had a compelling state interest which could
justify the denial of religious freedom under the Police Code,10 9
but also that the City had failed to satisfy its obligation to pursue
this interest by the least restrictive means. 10 To the contrary,
Walker contended that San Francisco did have a compelling in-
terest in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion and that the Police Code was the lease restrictive means
available to implement this interest."'
Walker contended that San Francisco's interest in prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation was compelling be-
cause such discrimination "poses a substantial threat to the health,
safety and general welfare of this community .. foments strife
and unrest, and deprives the City and County of the fullest utiliza-
tion of its capacities for development and advancement.""' 2 It
would seem, however, that such broad predictions do little to es-
tablish a compelling state interest in ensuring that homosexuals
are hired as part-time organists by churches" 3 since, as Walker
admitted, there are numerous jobs outside the Church community
where homosexuals can find employment." 4
Walker also compared employment discrimination against
homosexuals to employment discrimination against black individ-
uals, women, and other minorities, and he contended that "[so
long as there is a group in this society that is oppressed and pun-
ished, and deprived of equal opportunity in employment, on a ba-
sis unrelated to the talents, aptitudes, behavior and potentials of
its members, none of us are free."" 5 Nevertheless, both the legis-
lators who enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1961 and the legislators
who enacted the California Fair Employment Practices Act, while
prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, sex and na-
tional origin, specifically refused to prohibit such discrimination
based on sexual orientation." 6 Furthermore, the Civil Rights Act
109. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 42.
110. Id at 41.
111. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 50, at 26-27.
112. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 50, at 26 (citing SAN FRANcIsco, CAL., MUN. CODE
art. 33, § 3302 (1978).
113. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 43.
114. Id at44.
115. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 50, at 26.
116. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 44. Congress has refused to adopt a pro-
posed amendment which would add sexual orientation to the Civil Rights Act's list of
19811
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of 1961 has exempted all church activities from its ban on employ-
ment discrimination." 7 Likewise, California explicitly excludes
churches from all state regulation in the area of employment dis-
crimination." 8 Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that the gov-
ernment of San Francisco like the federal government and the
government of California, has no compelling interest in enforcing
employment regulations against the church.
Assuming, arguendo, that San Francisco does have a compel-
ling state interest in its antidiscrimination legislation, it must at-
tempt to attain its legislative purpose without burdening, or
impinging upon, religion."19 The Church contended that a less
restrictive means by which the government could protect its com-
pelling interest would be to "ensure homosexual employment
outside the Church in the commercial and secular world without
intruding into what is a small pool [sic] of 'employment' for
homosexuals, ie., Churches."' 2 ° Walker, by contrast, failed to ex-
plain why and how the application of the Police Code to the
Church would provide the least restrictive means for alleviating
"a substantial threat to the health, safety and general welfare" of
San Francisco, or for preventing "strife and unrest" in that com-
munity, or the community's "fullest utilization of its capacities for
development."'' Thus, the Police Code, without an exemption
unlawful classifications. Congressional Record, H.R. 166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG.
REC. 8548 (1975). For a discussion of congressional action on this subject, see Voyles v.
Davies Med. Center, 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), and Siniscalco, Homosexual
Discrimination in Employment, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 495, 502-03 (1976).
Federal courts also have rejected the argument that sex discrimination, prohibited by
the Civil Rights Act, includes discrimination based on sexual preference. DeSantis v. Pa-
cific Tel. & Tel. Co., [1976] EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) (13 Empl. Prac. Dec.) 11,335
(N.D. Cal.); Voyles v. Davies Med. Center, 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Smith
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (D.C. Cal. 1975).
117. "This title shall not apply... to a religious corporation, association, educational
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion
to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educa-
tional institution, or society of its activities." Equal Opportunities Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970)).
118. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 44 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 1413 (West)).
119. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (municipal ordinance requir-
ing itinerant evangelists to pay a license tax held invalid because the very existence of their
religion which they spread by personal visitations and evangelizing was at risk); Schneider
v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (government interest in keeping streets clean is
insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person from handing literature to one
willing to receive it on a public street); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
120. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 42.
121. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE art. 33, § 3302 (1978) states: "[D]iscrim-
ination based on sexual orientation. . . poses a substantial threat to the health, safety and
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for churches, does not appear to be the least restrictive means by
which to effectuate the questionably compelling interest in prohib-
iting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Analysis of the "least restrictive means" thesis as argued by the
Church and Walker suggests the final guideline for determining
the boundaries of a church's first amendment right to discharge a
secular employee for violating an essential church tenet. The
courts should consider whether any statutory civil right relied
upon by the discharged secular employee represents a compelling
state interest and whether the legislation granting the civil right is
the least restrictive means to the attainment of that interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note addressed a question which the courts, until re-
cently, have not addressed: Whether the first amendment allows a
church to discharge a secular employee who has violated an essen-
tial tenet of church doctrine when that employee claims the pro-
tection of antidiscrimination legislation. An examination of the
judicial treatment of the church-minister relationship demon-
strated that if no fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness if proven, and if
no compelling state interest is asserted, the first amendment grants
the church absolute discretion over the relationship.' 122
Furthermore, the rationale underlying this rule-that in
uniquely ecclesiastical matters, the rights of a religious body can
outweigh the civil rights of its minister-may be applied to
Walker. To force the Church to retain an openly unrepentant sin-
ner as an integral part of its worship team would have been to
subordinate ecclesiastical doctrine to Walker's rights. The first
amendment, as evidenced by the church-minister rule, prohibits
such imposition.
Second, an examination of judicial treatment of the church-
secular employee relationship revealed that government employ-
ment regulations do apply to secular employees involved in non-
religious, commercial, and interstate commerce activities.' 23
Walker, however, was employed for his hymn-playing talent, not
his fundraising abilities. Also, the Church is not involved in com-
mercial activity, rather, the Church's acknowledged purposes are
general welfare of this community. Such discrimination foments strife and unrest, and it
deprives the City and County of the fullest utilization of its capacities for development and
advancement."
122. See notes 24-35 supra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
1981]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
to worship God in the manner in which it believes He or She has
commanded, to gain converts, and to build up the existing body of
believers.' 24 Moreover, the Church emphatically maintains that
all money given to it is "tithe money which belongs to God."' 25
Thus, since its sincere goals are religious, not commercial, the first
amendment should have barred the application of the Police Code
to the Church's decision to discharge its secular employee who
had violated an essential church tenet.
This Note also examined the arguments set forth by the parties
in Walker and recognized principles regarding the import of the
Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the "least re-
strictive means" theory which could have been applied in that
case.' 26 First, since the Church tenet that homosexuality is sinful
appears to be sincerely held'27 and essential to the practice of the
Church's religion, the application of the Police Code would have
been a denial of the Church's Free Exercise; the Church's beliefs,
however sincere, would have been rendered nugatory. 28 Second,
applying the Police Code to force the Church to retain Walker in
its employ would, in effect, have demonstrated governmental pref-
erence for a religion which condones homosexuality over the
Church's religion which condemns it.' 29 Such preference violates
the Establishment Clause. Third, the application of the Police
Code to the Church suggested, at least, potential entanglement of
the government in Church affairs because the Code provides for a
Human Rights Commission investigation and mediation of any
related charges filed against a church.'30 Such entanglement, in
and of itself, is prohibited by the Establishment Clause. Fourth,
the government arguably was unable to demonstrate a compelling
state interest in encroaching upon the Church's employment deci-
sions, for religious employment is but a miniscule part of the labor
opportunity for homosexuals. More significantly, neither Califor-
nia nor the federal government has found such a compelling inter-
est; the employment regulations of neither body prohibit
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.13 ' Fi-
nally, assuming that San Francisco did have a compelling interest,
124. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 18-19.
125. Id at 19.
126. See notes 49-121 supra and accompanying text.
127. Brief for Defendant, supra note 50, at 4-6.
128. Id at 9, 11-15.
129. See notes 87-88 supra and accompanying text.
130. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
131. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
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applying the Code to the Church would not have been the least
restrictive means of attaining that interest. The tremendous dam-
age done to the Church's worship service, and, perhaps, to its very
existence, appears heavily to outweigh the minimal increase in the
local employment opportunities for homosexuals which the appli-
cation of the Code might have brought about.
The analysis presented by this Note suggests that if the follow-
ing conditions are met, a church will be protected by the first
amendment in discharging a secular employee who has violated
an essential church tenet even though the employee otherwise
would be sheltered by antidiscrimination legislation: (1) the
church tenet is sincerely held and essential to the practice of the
religion; (2) the employee is not engaged in commercial,
profitmaking activities for the church; (3) the legislation affording
civil rights to the discharged secular employee, in effect, prefers
that employee's view of religion over the church's doctrine; (4)
such legislation causes excessive, or potentially excessive, entan-
glement of government in church affairs; and (5) the statutory civil
right upon which the secular employee relies does not represent a
compelling state interest, or the legislation granting the civil right
is not the lease restrictive means to the attainment of a compelling
state interest.
JOHN SCOTT SHAFFER, JR.
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